Introduction
Large current account imbalances over the nineties and the first half of past decade gave rise to sizeable cross-country imbalances differences in net investment position (NIIP) not only across global economy, but also within euro zone. The vulnerability associated with high external liabilities in a context of financial turbulences was underscored by recent developments in the euro area, since EMU peripheral countries, including Spain, had net debtor international investment positions (IIP) GDP ratios higher than 70% GDP at the onset of the crisis (end-2008).
In addition, when global data are employed, including emerging and advanced economies, external crisis are more likely when net debtor IIP was above 70% of GDP at the end of 2007
(Catao and Milessi-Ferreti, 2014) . A high net debtor IIP often indicates a significant burden of refinancing that may increase the degree of macrofinancial vulnerability in case of tensions in capital markets. In fact, the net IIP is included in set of indicators of the EU macroeconomic imbalances procedure. So, establishing an external crisis early warning system may be a relevant tool for macroprudential policy.
The links between an economy's external vulnerability and its indebtedness vis-a-vis the rest of the world are complex, as they encompass various dimensions of external liabilities composition.
External vulnerability may reflect, firstly, high external liabilities in net or gross terms. Some authors argue that the relevant indicator is the gross external liabilities (Shin, 2012) , since it is a better indicator of the degree of international financial integration and of refinancing needs associated to external indebtedness. However, Catao and Milesi-Ferreti (2014) estimate that net external liabilities are also a robust predictor of external stresses. The aggregate behaviour of NIIP and external debt may mask very different patterns across the institutional sectors (public sector and private sector) and financial instruments (enforceable and non-enforceable), which are crucial to assess the external vulnerability.
So, the implications of a certain level of external liabilities are conditioned by their composition by instruments, sectors, term and currencies. Thus, given a certain level of external liabilities, refinancing risks would be more pronounced when the proportion of enforceable instruments -such as fixed income or other investment -, is high, since this kind of investments imply the compulsory future realization of amortization and/or interest payments. The business cycle position and macro policies stance also influence in the level of external indebtedness compatible with macro-financial stability. It should also be borne in mind that it is not possible to extrapolate mechanically any increase in external liabilities valuation as an increase in vulnerability, since its evolution over time depends not only on the behavior of the current account (CA), but also on the called valuation effects (VE).
Against this background, our target is to build an early warning system of external turbulences, which consists of three main stages. In the first place, we must define what is meant as an episode of external turbulence. Next, we proceed to the selection of variables that significantly affect the probability of such episodes. These variables are chosen through the results of panel data probit regressions. Finally, we estimate a composite alert indicator and the so-called risk thresholds for each variable, focusing attention on those that quantify external indebtedness.
The contribution of this paper to the literature is to combine the two predominant approaches in the literature (probit regressions and signalling system) in a two-step procedure in order to get a more robust early warning system, since in the first step probit regressions identifies external stress determinants. In addition, the regressions allow estimating the contribution of each regressor to crisis probability. In the second step, we implement an early warning system
We use an updated version of the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) Probit analysis allows identify potential interactions among variables.
Once established the main variables which affect external crisis probability, we apply a signalling approach to build up an external stress early warning system for a set of selected EMU countries and thus identify thresholds beyond which a further buildup of net/gross external liabilities sharply raises stress risk. Thresholds are country specific, in order to take into account heterogeneity across economies.
The main findings of this paper show that higher (net) foreign liabilities increase the risk of external tensions even after controlling for other factors. Second, risk rises as the composition of external liabilities is biased toward debt instruments (mainly portfolio or other investment), whereas higher FDI liabilities tend to reduce crisis risk. Third, current account deficits have, in general, a high impact on external stress probability. Also, advanced economies can face higher levels of external indebtedness than emerging countries. These findings are consistent with standard sovereign debt models, which have long focused on the ratio of external debt liabilities Yue, 2012). Early warning estimates show that external indebtedness in EMU peripheral countries remain higher than risk thresholds and stress probability increased sharply during euro crisis.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset, the external stress episode definition employed in this work and summarizes the stylized facts that characterize such events. Section 3 discusses the variables that affect turbulences probability through probit regressions. Using the determinants chosen in section 3, section 4 describes the implementation of an external stress early warning system for a set of selected EMU countries, which allows compute thresholds above which crisis risk increases rapidly and estimates an aggregate early warning indicator. Section 5 discusses briefly some concerns on endogeneity bias and the potential incidence of VE for thresholds estimates. Finally, section 6 draws the main conclusions from the analysis. and Frankel and Rose (1996) ). Last, we also contemplate other episodes of external turbulence associated with a very abrupt pre-accumulation of external imbalances, a mechanism that raised the external fragility of some EMU peripheral economies during the previous expansionary phase 6
. For this purpose, we add as a third criterion a current account deficit accumulated in the previous three years of at least 25% of GDP, provided that the net debtor IIP in t-3 was above 50% of GDP. We exclude from our sample episodes that are ramifications of major crisis outbreak, until market re-entry 7
. Although this reduces the number of episodes, it is consistent with the conception that external stress episodes have long-lasting consequences. In addition, this strategy mitigates estimation biases from feedback effects of the crisis onto the explanatory variables, as discussed in Bussière and Fratzscher (2006) , and makes episodes more Data show that countries that suffer external turbulences show higher both net debtor IIP (particularly in debt instruments) and CA and public deficits, while real GDP growth is lower (Chart 2). In average, real effective exchange rates are more appreciated 8 . If we employ a stress definition without CA accumulation criterion, we obtain qualitatively similar results. Deviations in case of external stress remain significant when we regress these variables against an external stress episode dummy, especially in the case of NIIP and net external debt (Table 1 ).
The nature of external tensions episodes can be better understood if we look at the behavior of some economic variables around such events. For that purpose, we compute prestress and post-stress averages of external indebtedness, CA and public balances, real GDP growth and REER. Such averages are computed over an 11-year window centered on the crisis year (t = 0) and spanning 5 years prior and after the external turbulences. As can be seen in Chart 3, these variables deteriorate with the onset of a crisis. NIIP and external debt averages deteriorates around a 40% at the onset of stress events. This development mostly reflects a worsening net external debt position. Regarding CA balance, countries start off with large current account deficits and, after stress, CA adjusts significantly (in average, CA deficit before external stress is around -7% GDP, and after the tensions the adjustment is around 5 pp GDP). Real GDP growth behavior shows a similar pattern. Our data also point that external stress episodes crises are preceded by a real exchange rate appreciation, followed by a depreciation.
8. In stress year, REER is a 5% more appreciated than average (13% in the year immediately before an episode).
External stress determinants
We now examine how net IIP and their composition affect external stress probabilities in the context of a multivariate probit model, which constitutes the first step of our methodology for building an early warning system. The choice of the possible determinants of an external turbulence episodes is made through a regression analysis in which the variable to be explained takes the value 1 in each episode of external stress and 0 in another case. Specifically, we run a probit regression such that:
Where i denotes the country, t the year, , is the external tension dummy, is a constant, , is a year fixed effect, , is the matrix of explanatory variables and Β is its coefficient vector and , is the error. Within , matrix are included -depending on the specification chosen -explanatory variables such as NIIP, foreign liabilities, relative per capita income, CA balance, public balance, long term interest rates, REER, real GDP growth.
We report the margin effects at mean in Table 2 . The results indicate that total external indebtedness to the rest of the world, both in gross terms and, particularly, in net terms,
anticipates the probability of external tensions occurring. The composition of this indebtedness is also relevant, since the probability of turbulence increases when it materializes through enforceable liabilities, while debit positions in foreign direct investment (FDI) would not increase the external vulnerability. Another key factor that raises the probability of external turbulence is the magnitude of the current account deficit, which is a proxy for speed external debt accumulation. The macroeconomic environment also matters for external stress risk: a lower real GDP growth increases stress probability, as occurs when REER appreciates. Risk stemming from weak economic activity appears related to net external liabilities. On the other hand, REER significance is consistent with EMU experience: peripheral Eurozone countries accumulated a significant price-competitiveness misalignment through REER appreciation that contributed to external imbalances. Finally, as the degree of development of an economy is higher, it usually presents smaller episodes of financial turbulence, for the same level of external indebtedness.
Also, there is some evidence, although not very robust, that public deficit and long term interest rates increases external stress probability.
Marginal effects are generally low, because stress episodes are infrequent events and are computed at the sample mean, but the non-linearity of the probit implies that these elasticities can be larger when are computed immediately before a turbulence event, when explanatory variables differ significantly from average as has been previously explained. In Chart 4, we compute marginal effects in the year before an external stress episode versus at mean: NIIP and, specially, CA marginal impacts are very much larger immediately before an event, signaling the substantial deterioration of external vulnerability that precedes an external stress episode.
Early warning system based on a country-specific signalling approach
Once the variables that significantly rise external stress probability have been identified, we use these results to estimate an early warning system, which is a particularly useful tool for the implementation of macro-prudential policy. Policy-oriented research on early warning has relied especially on the signalling approach, thus European Commission use this approach for surveillance tasks. Our purpose in this section is to estimate an early warning indicator for a group of selected EMU countries 9
Signalling approach can integrate a large number of variables and can deal with data availability problems in unbalanced panels, as is the case of the data employed in this work. Also, this approach can be implemented relatively easily, since the thresholds derived for the indicator variables can directly be used for policy surveillance and analysis. International empirical evidence suggests that early signaling warning systems have a higher predictive power than multivariate probit models in out-of-sample forecasts (see Cos et al., 2014). All of this might outweigh the major disadvantage of signalling approach: neither correlations between different variables nor individual variables conditional statistical significance cannot be tested. On the other hand, early warning estimates should be taken with caution, given the methodological difficulties arisen by this methodology. In particular, it should be borne in mind that threshold estimates depend of a very small number of event episodes, which reduces their robustness and their predictive power outside the sample used for their estimation. In addition, such predictive power also decreases as the signalling window is more dilated over time (i.e. variables lags are longer).
On the basis of probits estimated in the former section, the variables chosen to develop the early warning system we choose as signaling variables NIIP, net external debt, CA balance, public balance, relative per capita GDP, long term interest rate, real GDP growth and REER. Also, we add as signaling variables the three-year averages for NIIP, gross and net external debt and total external liabilities in order to soften possible significant valuation effects, which may be very substantial in a given year 10 . We exclude more disaggregated stock data because data availability is minor and the harmonization between different countries face more difficulties.
The next two steps to construct an early warning system are to calculate thresholds for each variable and, after, aggregate these variables into a composite index for signalling external stress. In this paper, warning forward signalling is of one year (i.e. we evaluate how well external turbulence stress in t is predicted based on data for t-1), following a widespread option in international literature (see Cos et al., 2014) . Thresholds are chosen to maximize signaling power of a given window with respect to past stress episodes.
The determination of the thresholds requires a choice of several methodological alternatives about the criterion of error prediction minimization and the common or specific country nature of such thresholds. a value above the threshold indicates external stress (i.e. the threshold is a minimum, like in the case of gross external liabilities), the type II error increases with the threshold value (more crises tend to missed), while the type I error (false alarms) decreases (because the system sends less often a crisis signal, if no crisis occurs). When the threshold is a maximum (like in the case of net IIP), the tradeoff is reversed. Consequently, the determination of the critical thresholds is a balance between minimizing the number of false alarms and of missed crisis. There are different methodologies to implement this balance. One is the maximization of the signal-to-noise ratio, based on the sum of true over the sum of false signals. Another one is the total misspecification error (TME), which is defined as TME=1-type I error-type II error. Signal-to-noise-ratio criterion assigns the same weight to false positive and false negative signals, while TME approach assigns a higher weight to false negative signals, as stress episodes are rare events.
In Chart 5 we plot predictive powers of the early warning index using TME or signal-tonoise ratio as alternative minimization criterion. The first methodology reach a consistently higher predictive power. In addition, since, we want to avoid especially false negative signals, which are likely to be far costlier than false positive signals, we apply TME criterion.
Another methodological relevant decision concerns about applying common or country specific thresholds. In the first case, all country-year pairs are treated as independent observations and the panel dimension of the data is ignored. This data pooling across countries increases the number of crises observations for the threshold identification, which should augment its robustness. However, critical levels for the thresholds of the variables signalling external stress might vary strongly in different countries (Reinhart et al., 2003) , and, on the other hand, the estimated common thresholds might be driven by outliers. As a result, common thresholds may lead to a lower predictive power when country heterogeneity in the sample is high.
In the sample, country heterogeneity is high, since external indebtedness EMU countries varies from creditor positions until very large debtor positions, and the sample applies for CA balance. One way to asses this heterogeneity is comparing country specific and common thresholds. As it is shown in Chart 5, gross and net external indebtedness thresholds vary significantly across EMU countries. For that reason we finally choose a country-specific criterion, which, in addition, allow us to estimate a composite index for each economy. Predictive powers of common and country-specific approaches are relatively similar. Results shown correspond to a signalling window of one year (stress predictions are based on data for t-1). However, data are often only available with a considerable time-lag and policy actions often need time to be implemented. Against this background, a longer signalling window would be necessary to detect ex ante external stress risks and have enough time to react. By way of illustration, we plot in Chart 7 the predictive power of TME country specific composite index across different signalling windows, which decrease continuously as window 11. The predictive power of the three-year averages of each variable tends to be slightly lower.
12.
Under the signalling approach interactions between the variables are not modelled, there are no distortions by variable interactions.
enlarges. So, results are less reliable when lags are longer and, so, signals should be interpreted with more caution.
Thresholds for composite indexes also reflect country-heterogeneity, since their levels and time evolution differ strongly across countries. The first lies between 0.2 and 1, while the evolution in time show a split between core and EMU periphery (Chart 5), that reflects countryspecific developments (Chart 8). We elaborate two aggregate composite GDP-weighted indexes, the first one, for all selected EMU countries and the second one only for EMU peripheral countries of the sample (Greece, Portugal and Spain). In the last group, the aggregate composite index rebounded sharply in the years immediately preceding the last crisis, as external imbalances accumulated in the expansive phase. Risk indicator reached its peak in coincidence with the turmoil in the sovereign markets of the EMU from 2010. This behavior reflect the individual index path for these peripheral economies.
Concerning the country specific thresholds, it should be noted that the actual and current external indebtedness of peripheral EMU economies is above of such thresholds, with gaps between 20% and 40% of net IIP or gross external debt (Chart 9). Thus, according to these estimates, EMU peripheral countries, including Spain, still maintain a significant degree of vulnerability in the face of a hypothetical deterioration of the international capital markets, due to its high external financial dependence. On the other hand, given any NIIP debtor level, external vulnerability also is influenced by external liabilities structure by currency, term, instruments and institutional sectors. For example, external vulnerability softens when a sizable portion of these are not fixed income, deposits or loans; and, consequently, are not subject to sudden withdrawal.
Concerning term, when the bulk of external liabilities are long term securities refinancing risks are lower and without any significant currency mismatch between external assets and liabilities also the impact of negative shocks on wealth derived from sharp depreciations is lower.
Related with the former, EMU integration would also mitigate macro financial vulnerability, since currency crisis are eliminated. But, in any case, external indebtedness still eventually matter within a currency union, especially because stock adjustment tends to be protracted 13 . The euro area financial crisis highlighted that countries with high external imbalances accumulated in the past are not immune to solvency and liquidity concerns, since in the absence of intra-euro area fiscal transfers, they are subject to the inter-temporal budget constraint. So, accumulated liabilities are expected to be matched by expected future surpluses, and a realignment of expectations would cause turbulences in financial markets. In addition, competiveness adjustments within EMU are protracted due to nominal wage rigidities and the relatively low level of inflation across the euro area.
13. For example, in the Spanish case Net IIP long term scenarios consistent with international macroeconomic forecasts project a gradual decline of net foreign liabilities (Banco de España, 2017). Under baseline scenario, net IIP would decrease gradually over the medium term, but this is subject to risks, since net IIP will still maintain a high level by 2026.
Robustness checks
The methodology used and the limitations of data, raise concerns about endogeneity bias, related mainly to the inclusion of the criterion of CA deficits accumulation. This criterion could bias the significance of NIIP and CA balance coefficients in probit regressions. In order to asses this potential bias, CA accumulation is excluded as a stress criterion definition. First of all, in Graph 2 green bars show that deviations from average of selected variables do not change qualitatively when stress episodes are defined without including CA criterion. Also, Table 3 reports probit regressions results with different specifications excluding CA criterion as a part of external stress definition. Again the significance and sign of NIIP and CA balance are robust to stress definition changes.
Other potential caveat concerning the results of the early warning system is that NIIP data include VE, which do not imply automatically changes in external vulnerability. 14. Indeed, in the case of equities, revaluations are frequently driven by changes in expectations about future income, and in the case of debt securities by changes in market yields and in the perceived solvency of debtors. 15. We do not accumulate by lending/borrowing capacity because capital account balance coverage is worse than those of CA balance. 16. We drop Belgium, since the deviations between the two measures is enormous. 17. In Spain, the threshold derived from NIIP base on CA accumulation is 30 GDP pp higher (the positive gap between actual NIIP and NIIP by accumulated CA amounts 20 GDP pp in 2016).
Concluding remarks
Since the mid-1990, issues about external vulnerability has been attracting attention from policy makers and economist, first due to the emergence of global imbalances reflecting a CA deficit in USA matched by surpluses run notably by Japan, China, Germany and oil exporting countries. Alongside global imbalances, imbalances within EMU between core surplus and peripheral deficit countries started widening shortly after euro introduction. These large current account gave rise to sizeable net debtor IIP in deficit countries, especially in the case of peripheral EMU countries. These imbalances are held to be one of the major causes both of international financial crisis and euro crisis, since global imbalances decreased long-term interest rates encouraging housing prices bubbles (Bernanke, 2009 ) and inflows of easy foreign borrowing allowed deficit countries postpone necessary structural reforms to restores competitiveness and fiscal consolidation (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2009) . A high net debtor IIP often indicates a significant burden of refinancing that may increase the degree of macrofinancial vulnerability in any event of financial markets stress which hamper access to foreign financing. Although CA deficit usually adjust sharply after an external turbulence episode, stocks correction is more protracted, which imply that external vulnerability may remain relatively high over time. Thus, it is still interesting for policy making to build external stress early warning systems to identify risk thresholds for external liabilities that, if surpassed, would be indicators of a significant increase in the vulnerability of the economy to turbulences in international markets.
Results obtained in this paper corroborates that large external debt liabilities increases the probability of external stress episodes. Decomposition of (net) external liabilities shows that (net) debt liabilities are the most important determinant of crisis risk and that their contribution is highly statistically significant. Second, the speed at which external indebtedness accumulates, proxied by CA deficits, is also a key factor. On the other hand, there is no evidence that higher net FDI liabilities increase crisis risk.
Actual external indebtedness of EMU peripheral countries, including Spain, remain above risk thresholds obtained by the early warning system implemented in this paper. Thresholds are sensitive to the way of computing NIIP: when we drop VE effects through CA accumulation, thresholds for EMU peripheral countries are above those corresponding to NIIP official data, which include VE effects.
The previous results indicate that a system of early warning indicators based on a country-specific signalling approach can generally help to detect external tensions. However, it is necessary to take into account the general caveats that surround this methodology. Firstly, early warning indicators are based on historical crises observations, but triggers of future crises events may differ from past episodes. In addition, the data used to build a system of early warning indicators are ex post, which are usually available with a lag and are subject to revisions. As shown in the paper, predictive power falls with out-sample predictions or when the signaling window is longer. Therefore, data availability and their quality can reduce the usefulness as a policy tool of an early warning system when we try to detect future external stress episodes, especially when it is necessary to adopt structural reforms which take time in their implementation and for having a favorable impact on the economy.
External indebtedness correction is usually a gradual process and requires to consolidate a sustained path of external surpluses, whose achievement would be fostered with further advances in structural reforms oriented to reinforce the structural consolidation of public accounts in EMU peripheral countries -against a background of population aging in advanced economies -and the external competitiveness of highly external indebted economies. These reforms could so promote genuine gains in productivity, cost moderation and the factors reallocation to sectors and firms with greater potential growth, for which it is necessary to remove the rigidities in factor and product markets and institutional constraints that limit the expansion of size firms.
FIGURES AND TABLES
SOURCE: Lane and Milessi-Ferreti (2007) and own calculations. 
REAL GDP GROWTH
SOURCES: own calculations. a. R obust standard errors in brackets. *, **, *** impliy statistical significativity 10% , 5% y 1% , respectively. -0.6*** -0.9*** -0.7*** -0.71*** -0.7*** -0.8*** -0.9*** -0.9*** (0.11) (0.17) (0.14) (0.11) (0.1) (0.14) (0.12) (0.17) R elative per capita GD P -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.1*** -0.06** -0.1*** -0.1*** -0.13*** -0.1*** -0.13 -0.11*** -0.09*** -0.14*** -0.13*** Regressio ns co ntro lled by year dummies.
P R O B IT E S T IM A T ES . C R IS IS P R O B A B ILIT Y
a. Ro bust standard erro rs in brackets. *, **, *** impliy statistical significativity 10%, 5% y 1%, respectively Regressio ns co ntro lled by year dummies.
P R OB IT EST IM A T ES. C R ISIS P R OB A B ILIT Y (A LT ER N A T IVE EXT ER N A L ST R ESS D EF IN IT ION WIT H OUT C
a. Ro bust standard erro rs in brackets. *, **, *** impliy statistical significativity 10%, 5% y 1%, respectively 
